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For better and for worse 
How unpaid bride wealth provides security  
 
Hans Hoogeveen  
Free University Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
 
Abstract 
The obligation to pay bride wealth at marriage is usually associated with the continuation of the 
lineage or considered a compensation for the loss of labor for the family that provides the 
bride. In this paper a different interpretation is advanced. The obligation to pay of bride wealth 
is seen as informal insurance which relies on the fact that bride wealth liabilities are contingent 
claims. Empirical evidence from Zimbabwe is presented to support this claim. In the absence 
of formal insurance mechanisms, bride wealth qualifies as an important security enhancing 
institution: the arrangement covers nearly the complete Zimbabwean adult population and 
permits to pool risks between many different families. Additionally the amounts involved are 
large and the period of time during which the claims provide security long. Like any informal 
insurance arrangement, the marriage system is prone to failure as a result of covariant risk and 
information and enforcement problems. It is shown how the marriage procedure deals with 
these problems. 
 
JEL classification: G21; O17, Q14 
Key words: Risk; Insurance; Institutions; Bride Wealth; Africa  
 
1. Introduction1 
 
African rural households involved in rain fed farming are exposed to large income variations. 
Being risk averse these households try to shield their consumption from these fluctuations. 
One way to do so is to rely on insurance arrangements. Unfortunately formal insurance 
services are generally absent in Africa’s rural areas. But informal arrangements are not. This 
is unsurprising in view of the magnitude of the income risks involved and the advantages that 
                                                 
1 This paper has benefited greatly from extensive discussions with and suggestions from Marleen 
Dekker, Jan-Willem Gunning, Peter Lanjouw and Takawira Mumvuma.  
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tightly knit communities have in dealing with information and enforcement problems. 
 
 
 
An illustration of a successful informal insurance arrangement in Africa are contingent credit 
contracts. These have been described by Udry (1990 and 1994) for Northern Nigeria. Despite 
being credit arrangements they comprise an insurance element because loan repayment 
depends on the economic condition of the agents involved. Creditors are lenient if their debtors 
go through a difficult period, while debtors make an extra attempt to repay if their creditor is in 
trouble. The Shona, the dominant ethnic group in Zimbabwe, operate a marriage system that 
comprises elements similar to the ones in a contingent credit contract. Instead of an 
outstanding loan, a claim is generated by demanding bride wealth for a daughter when she gets 
married of which the groom pays only part at the date of marriage. The bulk remains 
outstanding and its repayment is contingent on the economic situation of both the groom as his 
father in law.  
 
There are several important differences between the bride wealth arrangement of the Shona 
and Udry’s contingent credit suggestive of the importance of the marriage arrangement as 
insurance. Firstly, the size of the claims is of a different order of magnitude (two to five years 
of average household income). Secondly the duration of the claims is much longer; complete 
repayment often takes as long as a lifetime. Additionally by associating claims to marriage, 
virtually nobody is excluded from the benefits of the arrangement. This is of importance, 
especially for the vulnerable who risk exclusion from informal insurance arrangements at times 
of covariant shocks (e.g. Sen, 1981). And finally the bride wealth system manages to combine 
the advantages of a large risk pool with the benefits of close monitoring.  
 
The suggestion that unpaid bride wealth enhances household security is new. In the 
anthropological literature bride wealth payments are primarily identified as means to ascertain 
the continuation of the lineage or as compensation for the loss of labor (Goody and Tambiah 
1973; Holleman 1975; Kuper, 1982; Tambiah, 1989). Marriage is also considered as vehicle 
that enhances trust between individuals or families. In this form it facilitates the pooling of 
resources (Rosenzweig, 1988; Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; Baerends, 1991) or the 
diversification of income risk (Arnott and Stiglitz, 1991). But bride wealth as a contingent claim 
has not been advanced before.  
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The data for this paper are from a unique African panel data set, collected annually between 
1992 and 1999 among a group of approximately 400 beneficiaries of Zimbabwe’s land reform 
program. Starting in 1997 comparable information has also been gathered on a group of 150 
non-program participants. An elaborate description of this data set can be found in Kinsey 
(1999) and Hoogeveen and Kinsey (forthcoming).2 For the determination of household 
incomes and livestock ownership use is made of all panel years. For questions related to the 
amount of bride wealth demanded and paid, use is made of a marriage module that was added 
to the questionnaire in 1996 and which comprises information on 571 marriages. For 
information on bride wealth related transfers use is made of surveys held between 1997 and 
1999 when questions pertaining to this issue were asked.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section two the insurance problem of a rural African 
household is presented. It is shown how a claims and liabilities arrangement can enhance 
security, and it is shown that to meet this requirement the arrangement should be contingent 
and the size of the claim large. The following section contains the main assertion of this paper. 
It not only qualifies the bride wealth arrangement of the Shona as a claims and liabilities 
arrangement, in an empirical test it is confirmed that the arrangement is conditional. In section 
four implications of the security enhancing interpretation of the bride wealth arrangement are 
considered. Consequences for contract enforcement, for the use of the arrangement by those 
whose incomes are less subject to variability, for the timing of marriage by the poor, for 
efficiency and the existence of other informal security enhancing arrangements are treated 
along with the question whether bride wealth as security enhancing mechanism is confined to 
Zimbabwe. Section five presents conclusions. 
 
2.  Conditional claims and liabilities 
 
Formal insurance is generally not observed in Africa’s rural areas. The reasons for this are 
well understood. Geographic correlation makes weather related risks difficult to cover. The 
cost of dealing with asymmetric information problems and enforcement difficulties raise 
insurance premiums beyond levels that households are prepared to pay. On top of that, 
                                                 
2 The data were collected under the supervision of Bill Kinsey. He kindly provided access to 
the information.  
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households may doubt the promise of the insurance company to cover losses if they arise.  
These problems do not preclude the appearance of informal insurance arrangements directed 
at idiosyncratic risks. Especially in communities where the cost of information collection can 
be kept down, contract enforcement is facilitated by the interlinked nature of transactions, 
punishment of non-compliers is possible and premiums are collected after the event, informal 
insurance arrangements can flourish. Burial societies, work parties, fire associations and 
reciprocal gift exchanges are examples of these (Scott, 1976; Fafchamps, 1992; Platteau, 
1997).  
 
In certain circumstances households run the risk of becoming excluded from informal 
insurance arrangements. Consider the following illustration for instance. A family in rural 
Africa tills the soil using cattle and its yields fluctuate from year to year. The household lives in 
a village and its variations in yield are less than perfectly correlated with that of its neighbors. 
Villagers with good harvests provide the household with gifts in years that it has been unlucky. 
In years in which the household obtained a good harvest the favors are returned. In this way 
the households in the village operate a reciprocal insurance arrangement. 
  
Because of the occurrence of some disease the household loses its draft power. From now on 
it has to prepare its land by hand which substantially reduces expected income. At plowing 
times the household tries to borrow draft animals, but by the time they are provided, the 
animals are worn out and the optimal time for planting long gone. The family tries to save from 
its proceeds, but buying two heads of cattle requires such a large amount that it is next to 
impossible to save a sufficiently large fraction from the meager income. Life becomes very 
hard. Nonetheless the household continues to participate in the reciprocal arrangement, albeit 
at a scale that is adapted to its lower mean income.  
 
Then a drought strikes, decimating aggregate village income. In their struggle to deal with the 
adverse circumstances the better off villagers sell livestock to buy food. The poor family does 
not have this possibility and is dependent on the solidarity of the better endowed villagers. But 
now that resources are scarce, they prefer to continue their reciprocal relations exclusively 
amongst themselves. Selling livestock to safeguard their poor neighbor –who is already 
weakened by malnutrition and whose prospects for survival are limited– at the expense of 
future income generating possibilities embedded in their cattle, is considered too costly.  
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That the latter possibility is the harsh reality for numerous African households is illustrated by, 
amongst others, Sen (1981) and Ravallion (1997). Sen was the first to show that famines do 
not have to occur due to the non-availability of food per se, but may be the consequence of the 
inability of some households to lay a claim on food or on the resources to purchase food. This 
can occur despite the presence of solidarity networks. Fafchamps (1992) and Coate and 
Ravallion (1993) formalize why at times informal insurances fail to offer protection. They point 
out that continued participation in an insurance arrangement where premiums are paid ex post 
and where the main punishment is exclusion from future insurance is only attractive if for each 
period the utility of reneging on the insurance plus the discounted expected utility that will be 
obtained if one is excluded from future insurance is less than or equal to the utility obtained 
from sticking to the contract now and in the future. The failure to insure can thus be related to 
two factors: (i) the (utility) costs of a net transfer to the unlucky household and (ii) the 
expected future benefits to the members of the insurance pool from a continued participation 
of the unlucky household.  
 
In the example the failure to provide solidarity could have been prevented by stronger 
enforcement. This might have been in the form of punishment of the coalition of wealthy 
households or through the advance payment of insurance premiums. Relying on credit would 
have been another option. If credit schemes are arranged like certain rotating  credit 
arrangements where the most needy obtain the pot first (Besley, 1995) or if people with good 
income draws accept to lend to those with bad draws, then credit contributes to income 
pooling (Platteau and Abraham, 1987; Udry, 1990 and 1994). But if the risk of default is high, 
typically when a household finds itself in a poor state of affairs, relying on credit is dangerous 
because it is not evident that someone will be prepared to lend to such a household. In fact, the 
more desperate the situation, the less likely it is that someone will be able to obtain resources 
as a credit, so that credit is probably not an option for the household in the example.  
 
Another possibility is to  make sure that each household has the right to put a claim on another 
household (and an offsetting obligation to meet a request). A claims and liabilities arrangement 
may provide security if claims have to  be honored irrespectively of the wealth status of the 
requesting household. In the example this kind of claim might have been of help in two ways: if 
the household could have effectuated it at the time of drought, or if it would have allowed the 
household to obtain before the drought resources with which cattle could be purchased. In the 
latter situation the household would have been less destitute when the drought arrived and 
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therefore less likely to become excluded from the solidarity arrangement. And, if it were 
excluded nevertheless,  it could at least have sold its beasts to obtain food with the proceeds.  
 
A claims and liabilities arrangement can be organized as follows.3 At its start a group of 
households issues claims on each other such that the net wealth position of each participant 
remains unchanged. After the issuance each household holds both a claim on a household in 
the pool and is indebted to another household in the same pool. If there are three households 
and the size of the debt is x then A holds a claim of x on B and has an obligation of similar size 
with respect to C. If B has a claim of x on C then each of the households in the pool is 
connected through claims and liabilities. If household A is the household in the illustration, then 
it may obtain the resources to purchase draft animals by effectuating its claim on B. If B 
cannot fulfill the request it may approach C and use the resources received to fulfill the 
obligation toward A. The passing on of the claim till it has reached a net provider of goods 
may be considered a way to deal with small risk pools by creating a string of bilateral relations. 
 
AßBß C  
 
Obviously if C is not able to fulfill the request, it may approach A. In that case the 
arrangement fails because all claims and liabilities cancel. This could occur in the instance of a 
covariate shock. One way to avoid this is to ensure that the pool of households from which 
can be claimed is large, implying a long chain of individual relations. Another possibility is to 
broaden the claim to include all endowments, so that even in the event of an aggregate income 
shock, claims can be put on the buffer stocks of well endowed households. A third option is to 
allow claims to be unfulfilled for a prolonged period of time and to wait till the debtor has 
accumulated sufficient wealth to repay. This strategy obviously only works if there is sufficient 
change in wealth status over time. 
 
For a proper functioning of the arrangement the claims should not be too small. There are at 
least two reasons for this. First if claims and liabilities are created only once, they will have to 
do a lifetime. More importantly having considerable claims is instrumental in avoiding a 
situation that is known within an IS-LM framework as the monetarist model. The monetarist 
                                                 
3 This mechanism has also been described as a possibility in the theoretical literature (Gauthier, Poitevin 
and González, 1997), but only for the case where ex ante payments are made irrespective of the 
realization of risk. In this case, the transfer is conditional on the realization of the risk, but independent 
of the state of wealth of the household. 
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model describes a situation in which there is insufficient liquidity around causing the 
transactions need for money to become the limit on output. In our if case claims are too small 
people might become hesitant to call them in out of fear for running out of claims in the future. 
But if agents become hesitant to effectuate their claims, it means that they are not easily 
passed on from one household to the next. It follows that the means of dealing with small risks 
pools through a string of relations collapses and that the size of the risk pool becomes limited to 
those indebted to you. A sizeable claim helps to avoid this situation. 
 
Unlike in a credit transaction where credit is demanded ex post, one expects that no interest 
will be paid on this ex ante arrangement. The reason for this is that a conditional claims and 
liabilities arrangement increases the net present value of expected utility of any participating 
household by reducing the variability of future income. Hence it is attractive to participate in a 
claims and liabilities pool, even in the absence of a possibility to demand interest. If a family is 
only prepared to join if interest is paid on net balances then other households would appear 
demanding less interest, effectively bidding the interest on the arrangement down to zero. But 
if a household used its claim but it did not yet fulfill its obligation then it is a net recipient of 
resources. In the absence of interest payments it follows that there is a real transfer of 
resources (unpaid interest) from the wealthy household to the poor one. This is a risk pooling 
element in the claims and liabilities arrangement. 
 
If the total outstanding claim is sufficiently large, then  it may allow the household to deal with 
all idiosyncratic risk. In that case the claims and liabilities mechanism is an alternative for 
informal insurance (provided that in the long run all households earn equal amounts). But if the 
total amount of claims is relatively small, then it pays to only effectuate these if the household 
is affected by grave events. And if it holds more than one claim, it will first effectuate the one 
on a relatively wealthy household so as to increase the probability of payment and to avoid a 
circular cancellation of claims and liabilities. This suggests that the arrangement automatically 
becomes conditional even if it was not intended to be so originally. There is an additional 
reason why one expects a claims and liabilities arrangement to be conditional. If a household 
would have to fulfill a claim when it does not possess the resources (including outstanding 
claims) to do so, then for precautionary reasons the household may decide not to participate in 
a claims and liabilities pool.4 A way to avoid refusal is to ensure that the obligation to repay 
                                                 
4 See also Skinner (1988) for a similar argument as to why households facing fluctuating incomes may be 
hesitant to borrow.  
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debt is conditional on possessing sufficient income (or outstanding claims). 
 
3.  Marriage among the Shona 
 
Shona marriage is a family affair and its arrangement takes a substantial period of time during 
which the families involved have many opportunities to familiarize themselves.5  The choice of 
spouses is left to the individuals concerned but has to be sanctioned by their parents. If the 
families of the prospective partners agree with the choice of their children, negotiations 
involving senior representatives of each family start about the compensation required for the 
girl: the bride wealth. Bride wealth is divided into two portions of which roora is the more 
substantial part. It is a payment in cattle and cash and is associated with rights by the groom’s 
family over the children born from the union. Roora is paid to the father of the bride. He can 
do with it as he likes but preferably he reserves the cattle received for the marriage exchanges 
of the young men of his family as they are entitled to receive from their father the cattle 
required for their first marriage. Full payment of roora is extended over an elaborate period. 
After paying the first installment of roora, the wife moves to the family of her husband where 
she is handed over to the head of the family of the groom. Only after a few days does he 
transfer the bride to her husband. In this way he underscores the family character of the 
marriage. After the girl has moved to the household of her husband the families remain related 
through a claim/liability, providing security to the girl’s family. Details of this arrangement are 
considered below. 
 
3.1  Information problems and covariance of risk 
 
Like formal insurance, informal insurance has to deal with information problems and problems 
posed by aggregate risk. To solve the former, detailed information on the incomes (and effort!) 
of the participants in the insurance pool is needed. If the members of the pool live in the same 
village, whether a farmer is hard working may be regarded to be common knowledge. 
Estimating each other’s income is also feasible. A well trained farmer should be able to 
reliably guess someone’s harvest from the crops observed in the field. Among the Shona even 
this skill is not required. Unlike in other places farmers are not secretive about their proceeds. 
After harvesting maize for instance (the main crop and staple food), the cobs are dried in 
                                                 
5 Shona marriage is extensively described in Holleman (1975), Bourdillon (1987), Weinrich (1977), Kileff 
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stacks put up outside the household and observable by anyone. Information problems about the 
receipt of a household’s income therefore are not insurmountable obstacles for informal 
arrangements among the Shona.  
 
A more pressing issue for an insurance operating in rural areas with rain fed farming, is the 
problem posed by aggregate risk. Income is closely related to the weather and as weather is 
strongly geographically correlated, pooling of household incomes can do little in terms of 
insurance. Consider table one for instance. It shows that crop and household income are highly 
correlated with national rainfall (correlation coefficients of 0.28 and 0.24 respectively). For an 
insurance company operating at the national level, these correlations might suggest scope for 
its services but for an informal arrangement such spreading is usually not attainable. Besides 
the problem caused by covariance is not entirely reflected in the correlation coefficients. In 
1992 for instance, a drought year, two third of the households did not harvest any maize and 
the households that harvested something produced an output that was one fifth of the mean 
harvest produced between 1991 and 1998. In 1995 another drought hit the country which left a 
quarter of all households without any maize to harvest. The remaining households produced 
only half of the 1991-1998 average. A local insurance that would try to cover these risks from 
insurance premiums would easily go bankrupt in these circumstances.  
 
A solution for this problem is not to pool incomes but to look for an insurance mechanism 
vested in a good that is less correlated with rainfall but which is still an important determinant 
of income. Livestock is an option here. As table one shows, household cattle ownership is only 
weakly (and insignificantly) correlated with national rainfall. But, the possession of cattle is 
closely associated with the ability to earn agricultural income. Households that possess 
sufficient draft animals obtain higher yields and cultivate a larger area because of their ability 
to use the plow and apply manure (Hoogeveen, 1999).  
 
Table 1 here  
 
The marriage arrangement makes use of the independence of cattle ownership and rainfall as 
cattle represents the bulk of the value of roora demanded. In 1995 the most recent year for 
which marriage information was collected, of the 27 marriages concluded that year, bride 
wealth demanded consisted of  Z$ 1765 in cash and 7.8 heads of cattle. At a median value of 
                                                                                                                                            
and Kileff (1992), Meekers (1993), Vijfhuizen (1998) and Dekker and Hoogeveen (2000). 
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cows, heifers and bulls of respectively Z$ 1200, Z$ 1000 and Z$ 1500 it follows that 
approximately 85 percent of bride wealth is demanded in livestock units.  
 
If a livestock based insurance mechanism is to function, the information problem surrounding 
the ownership of livestock has to be solved. Fortunately in Zimbabwe it is not difficult to 
establish the number of cattle a household possesses as the animals are put into the family 
kraal every night where they are to be observed by anyone. To the degree that direct 
observation is not possible (for instance because some beasts have been lent) then the 
daughter/wife is in a unique position to ensure an impartial flow of information between the 
two families bond by a claim/liability arrangement, to which she is intimately connected. 
 
There are two additional arguments to base an insurance mechanism on livestock. First, cattle 
is the main store of wealth. Even if one does not intend to use the animals for plowing, they 
are still useful as buffer stock to be liquidated in adverse circumstances. Kinsey et al.(1998) 
show for instance that livestock sales were the primary source of money for food purchases 
during the 1992 and 1995 droughts in Zimbabwe. Table one confirms this. It shows that the 
sale of cattle is strongly (negatively) correlated with rainfall. Second, households without 
sufficient draft animals risk ending up in a poverty trap (Hoogeveen, 1999). So the possession 
of sufficient animals is a major concern. And as the number of cattle may be decimated by 
exogenous events that can therefore permanently affect a household’s wealth status, a 
mechanism that ensures access to additional beasts in adverse times is of great value. 
 
3.2  Outstanding claims 
 
If the demand of bride wealth is to result in a claim that has an insurance function three 
criteria have to be met. First, all bride wealth should not be paid at the time of marriage. 
Amongst the interviewed households there is clear resentment against those that pay their 
bride wealth too quickly. Doing so is associated with the denial by the son in law of the 
relationship between his family and their in laws (Dekker and Hoogeveen, 2000). Second, 
given that weather risk is an annual phenomenon and that the total amount which can be 
claimed limited (when all daughters are married, additional claims cannot be generated), a 
payment schedule that lasts a long time, preferably a life time, is attractive. Thirdly, the claim 
has to be conditional. In this way one is able to obtain cattle when such is needed and one 
avoids having to provide cattle when animals cannot be spared. The first two are treated in 
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this subsection. The third aspect is treated separately. 
 
Of the 571 marriages for which information is available , 20 percent of the marriages 
completed their bride wealth liabilities. In 79 percent of the marriages, cattle payments were 
still due. Figure one presents a kernel estimation of the number of livestock paid as function of 
the years of marriage. It shows that about ten percent is paid at the time of marriage. After 35 
years of marriage about 20 percent of bride wealth is still outstanding. Both are in accordance 
with the insurance function of claims. 
 
Figure 1 here  
 
That after 35 years a substantial part of bride wealth is still outstanding, does not imply that 
bride wealth is not paid in full. On the contrary, at the death of one of the spouses several 
options for the repayment of bride wealth may be explored. If the wife died young and she has 
unmarried sisters, one of them might replace her in a substitution marriage. If the husband died 
young, a brother might replace him in a replacement marriage. In each of these cases, the 
remaining liabilities are passed on to the new couple. If substitution or replacement marriages 
do not take place, the outstanding debt may be paid from the inheritance (resulting in an 
outtransfer of cattle). A relatively new phenomenon is that the wife of the deceased is allowed 
to remarry. In that case, the husband’s brother will take care of the widow, but allow other 
men to date (and marry) her. Any bride wealth received will then be used to repay outstanding 
bride wealth liabilities. If none of these options is available, the bride wealth liabilities are taken 
over by the family of the deceased groom.  
 
3.3  Conditionality of the  arrangement 
 
For marriage claims to enhance security, it is essential that a family can provide bride wealth 
when it is relatively wealthy and that it obtains bride wealth when needed. If the household has 
to supply bride wealth when it is poor then the bride wealth system need not enhance 
household security and prudent families will be reluctant to participate because they run the 
risk to have to give up resources when they are already low.  
 
Since families hold both liabilities and claims, a bride wealth arrangement can only be 
functional if cattle ownership changes over time. Wealthy households are especially interested 
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in the security offered by a claims and liabilities arrangement if maintaining their wealth is not 
automatic and households with few cattle can only meet their obligation if they can improve 
their wealth position over time. Table two, which comprises information on cattle ownership 
after (bride wealth related, or other) cattle transactions took place, shows substantial 
movement in cattle ownership. Of the households that possessed few (at most two) beasts in 
1992 40 percent had moved to the wealthier categories of households owning at least seven 
animals. The reverse also happens. Of the households in the wealthy categories in 1999, 30 
percent owned two or fewer head of cattle in 1992.  
 
Table 2 here  
 
About eight percent of the households had two beasts or less both in 1992 and in 1999. These 
households might endanger the existence of the debt arrangement if they claim outstanding 
bride wealth, while remaining unable to pay their due. To deal with this possibility and only if 
the groom is very poor and sincere, the father of the bride may allow the groom to pay (part 
of) the outstanding roora from the bride wealth received from marrying of a daughter out of 
one’s own marriage (Holleman, 1975). Debt repayment is thus ensured though it will be 
postponed for a long period (a generation!).  
 
Another way to prevent the collapse of the arrangement because of the non-payment of bride 
wealth, is to make the whole family responsible for the honoring of bride wealth debt. That is 
one reason behind the family character of Shona marriage. If the groom cannot pay, his father 
(who is also the owner of bride wealth claims if he has married daughters) might be in a 
position to pay. So if  husband A is in need, he can approach his father, who may tell A’s 
sister’s husband (B) to pay part of his outstanding bride wealth. If B cannot repay he can 
approach his father who, in turn, can put a claim on his son in law (C). In this way there is a 
string of debt relations that can be called upon, so that there exists a large group of people who 
can possibly become the net source of cattle to be transferred to a household in need. It 
follows that if such individualized mutual debt relations work, that there are numerous 
households that both receive an in-transfer of cattle and transfer cattle out. Only households in 
need would be net recipients, while (temporarily) well to do households would be net 
providers. 
 
If the payment is circular A à B à C à A, then quickly all households would be out of 
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claims. This obviously can not be efficient so that A has an incentive to look for a household 
that is immediately able to pay, suggesting that the arrangement is contingent. Also, in years 
with covariate risks it does not make sense if everybody starts calling in bride wealth debt as 
this means that cattle is circulated but not much is attained. In those circumstances it only 
helps to claim from wealthy households.  
 
In the marriage arrangement elaborate safeguards are built in, that ensure the spreading of 
claims and liabilities relations in a way that makes it more likely that a request for payment can 
be met. Reverse exchange marriages where both a son and a daughter marry into the same 
family (and for which no net  bride wealth payments would be due) are taboo, just like 
marrying someone with the same clan and sub-clan name. Bourdillon (1987) presents an 
extensive treatment on the kind of Shona kinship relations that are allowed. In short the rule is 
that relations are forbidden if one is related to the third degree (for instance if a child of your 
parents’ siblings is married into a given family then you are not allowed to marry into that 
same family). In practice this creates an enormous group of affines that can easily comprise 
several hundred families.  
 
To further explore whether a family in need manages to obtain bride wealth from its debtors, 
and whether its debt owners reclaim bride wealth when the family is relatively wealthy, two 
village level fixed effects logit regressions are presented in table three. One with as dependent 
variable whether the family received bride wealth; the other with the provision of bride wealth 
as dependent variable. Due to missing information, 33 observations had to be dropped, leaving 
a total of 1631 observations. As it is unknown whether a family has any outstanding or 
claimable debt, the estimations are limited to the sub-population of households with heads aged 
35 or over. The presumption is that heads of household of at least this age can reasonably be 
expected to participate in the bride wealth system. In doing so the sample size was reduced to 
1543 observations.  
 
The amount of livestock resources (before transfers) is taken as indicator of family wealth. 
Obviously consumption is the preferred measure to approximate welfare status, but no reliable 
information on expenditures is available. Livestock holdings are a reasonable alternative, if 
only because Zimbabwean families associate livestock ownership strongly with wealth 
(Scoones, 1995). This should come as no surprise, given the important role draft animals fulfill 
in income generation (Hoogeveen, 1999) and its role as buffer stock (Kinsey et al., 1998). 
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Seen in this light, livestock ownership is probably a better proxy for a family’s permanent 
wealth status than household income which fluctuates strongly from year to year. Nonetheless, 
the latter factor is also included (as the log of real total household income) to inform on how 
resource fluctuations affect the transfer of bride wealth. Additionally, to capture the covariate 
element of income, rainfall in millimeters and measured at the national level is incorporated. 
 
For families that provided and received bride wealth in a given year the order of the events is 
not known, so that no causal inferences can be made. For our purposes this is fine as it does 
not matter whether a family first provided bride wealth, then considered its possession of 
wealth too low after which it called in bride wealth; or whether the family first received bride 
wealth and thereafter became more willing (and able) to honor a request for the repayment of 
outstanding debt. It is expected that it matters whether a household possesses sufficient draft 
animals for plowing. Therefore a distinction is made between households that transfer bride 
wealth and possess a minimum number of draft animals and those that do not. The cut off 
point is put at 2.5 trained oxen equivalents, a number that allows the household to pull a plow. 6  
 
To allow for the fact that a household obtains a transfer of cattle as first installment of bride 
wealth payment when a daughter gets married, a dummy variable is included for daughters 
aged 15 or over that got married and started to live with their husband. No information on 
marital status was available for those below the age of 15.  A household may also experience 
an out-transfer of wealth following a death in the family. This will be the case if the deceased 
is a wife for whom bride wealth is still outstanding, but also if it is a husband who still has to 
pay part of the outstanding bride wealth. In either case one expects an out-transfer. This is 
included by a dummy variable for death in the family.  Finally, differences due to participation 
in the land reform program are allowed for. To this end a dummy for non-beneficiary 
households is included. 
 
Table 3 here  
 
                                                 
6 The following fractions, based on relative prices, are used to obtain trained oxen equivalents: cow 0.73; 
heifer, 0.61; bull, 0.89; trained oxen, 1.00; young oxen, 0.57; calf , 0.30; donkey, 0.18; sheep, 0.08; goat, 
0.06 and pig, 0.06. Obviously owning 33 pigs will not allow one to plow, but a household that possess 
this number of pigs is in a position to sell them and purchase the draft power required. Livestock 
markets in rural Zimbabwe are sufficiently liquid to allow for such substitution. 
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The estimation results are reported in table three. The first thing to note is that the sign of the 
coefficient on pre-transfer livestock possessions switches. It is negative in the case of the 
receipt of bride wealth (implying that poorer households are more likely to obtain bride wealth) 
and positive for the provision of livestock so that the wealthier households are more likely to 
provide bride wealth.  
 
For households possessing sufficient draft animals, in-transfers of bride wealth are positively 
associated with out-transfers. The same holds for out-transfers of bride wealth which are 
positively associated  with in-transfers. This is suggestive of the circulation of cattle, a 
phenomenon reported by Mair (1977) to be the “essence of the bride wealth system” p.58. 
From our perspective it is a way to deal with the problem of small risk pools. Households that 
received an in-transfer of bride wealth and that are poor do not participate in the passing on of 
bride wealth: in their case the coefficient is insignificant. A Wald test (reported at the bottom 
of the table) shows that the coefficients for wealthy households differ significantly from those 
for poor households. It follows that wealthier households are the ones that participate in the 
circulation of cattle, and that the poorer ones do not. In combination with the fact that the 
livestock poor are more likely to receive bride wealth and less likely to provide it, it suggests 
that cattle is circulated through society till it reaches its destination at a poor household.  
 
That wealthy households are more actively involved in the circulation of cattle, is also 
illustrated by the fact that those with higher incomes participate more actively in the provision 
and in the receipt of bride wealth: in both regression the signs for real income are positive. 
Despite this active participation by the wealthy, the bride wealth system is not immune to the 
consequences of covariate events. The regression for the in-transfer of bride wealth shows 
this: households are more likely to receive bride wealth in years of good rainfall.  
 
Death in the family leads to an out-transfer of bride wealth, either to settle unpaid bride wealth 
(in case a wife dies) or to deal with inheritance issues (in the case a husband dies).  Marriage 
leads to an in-transfer in accordance with the results of the kernel regression presented as 
figure one. Non-land reform beneficiaries participate less in bride wealth exchanges. This 
might be because resettled households, who started off as complete strangers, actively build 
networks within their own villages. One of the ways to do so is through intra-village marriages, 
which in turn, facilitates monitoring and the transfer of bride wealth. In communal areas intra-
village marriages are uncommon. Another reason might be that land reform beneficiaries rely 
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for a much larger fraction of their income on agriculture (in 1997/98 for instance crop income 
alone made out 64 percent of the income of land reform beneficiaries 40 percent of non-
beneficiaries) thus making them more reliant on bride wealth transfer.  
 
In conclusion, the regressions confirm that unpaid bride wealth is a conditional arrangement 
allowing poor households to obtain resources. The probability of providing bride wealth 
increases with the possession of household wealth as measured in livestock equivalents. 
Households with higher incomes, and resettled households participate more actively in the 
bride wealth system. The arrangement is not immune to covariant risks and in years with little 
rainfall the probability to receive an in-transfer of bride wealth decreases. 
 
4. Implications of insurance interpretation of bride wealth  
 
In the previous section the prime assertion of this paper was established. Bride wealth claims 
and liabilities enhance household security by creating claims whose repayment is contingent on 
the economic situation of both the groom and his father in law. But the results of table three 
could be given a different interpretation if being wealthy is associated to having a larger bride 
wealth liabilities. This could come along if in the negotiations on the height of the bride wealth, 
the wealth of the father in law is taken into account in such a way that wealthier families 
demand less for their daughters than they have to pay for their sons. Or it could occur if 
households with a surplus of sons become relatively wealthy, because young men are more 
productive than young women. Unfortunately, household wealth at the time when bride wealth 
is demanded, and the total claims and liabilities of each household have not been recorded, so 
that this interpretation cannot be put to empirical scrutiny.7  
 
Therefore to put the insurance interpretation of marriage to further scrutiny several of its 
implications are considered. In this section it is considered how the arrangement is enforced, 
what the consequences are if income risks are smaller and diversification easier (for those 
                                                 
7 Since rainfall is the most important determinant of income in rural Zimbabwe, and as income and wealth 
are associated one way to check whether bride wealth depends on household wealth is to investigate 
the correlation between rainfall and bride wealth demanded. In regressions in which the height of the 
bride wealth is explained by rainfall alone and in combination with a squared term, none turned out be 
significant. 
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living in urban areas), whether daughters from households that are vulnerable to income 
shocks (the poor) marry younger because of the incentive to possess a positive balance in 
bride wealth claims. 
 
4.1  Enforcement 
 
In section two, it was stated that a “claims and liabilities arrangement may provide security if 
claims have to be honored irrespectively of the wealth status of the requesting household”. 
How it can be assured that claims will be honored has not been made clear, but obviously it is 
of interest to know how the enforcement issue is solved in the bride wealth arrangement. That 
it is solved follows implicitly from the fact that bride wealth resources are transferred in a way 
that enhances household security. There are several mechanisms that improve the possibilities 
for contract enforcement. First there is the moral obligation that one has to pay its due. 
Especially since bride wealth claims are generated before the event.  So unlike a credit 
provider who may refuse to provide his personal resources to another household, someone 
who owes unpaid bride wealth is likely to feel obliged to fulfill the request. This is reinforced 
by the fact that he has received something important from the claimant: his wife. She, by the 
way is likely to make precisely this point to her husband. Secondly there is flexibility in the 
repayment. The number of cattle is carefully stipulated in the bride wealth negotiations, there 
is flexibility in the kind of beasts that have to be provided (Dekker and Hoogeveen, 2000). 
And, finally there are the (extra) legal  means of contract enforcement.  
 
In the marriage arrangement punishment may be imposed if the son in law is in a position to 
repay but refuses to do so. The claimant has the possibility to take his daughter and her 
children into custody until the demand for debt repayment, or a sufficient part thereof, is 
honored (Holleman, 1975). The possibility to take one’s daughter and her children back, is a 
serious threat for two reasons. Firstly it deprives the unwilling husband of his contribution to 
the lineage and of sons that will take care of him in old age (Bourdillon, 1987). Secondly, in a 
society where labor markets are absent, family labor goes at a premium and ambitious men try 
to build around themselves a sizeable family of agricultural laborers (Binswanger and McIntire, 
1987; Bourdillon, 1987). In many instances it is not necessary to resort to the drastic measures 
of custody and does it suffice to suggest that ancestors with the ability to cause barrenness in 
the marriage might be displeased by the refusal of the son in law. Such a threat is taken very 
seriously also because certain ceremonies in the marriage procedure, like the transfer of a 
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cow to the mother of the bride  (because she carried the daughter in her womb) which is 
subsequently dedicated to maternal ancestors, create a close connection between the payment 
of bride wealth and the birth of offspring (Holleman, 1975).  
 
Another possibility is to turn to a traditional court. The marriage procedure comprises several 
elements which facilitate ruling by traditional courts. Use is made of an intermediary for 
instance. This is a carefully selected, trustworthy person, who operates as go-between when 
the intention of marriage is made known to the family of the bride. He (women do not act as 
intermediary) acts as official witness to all marriage transactions and is expected to be an 
impartial observer. In court the intermediary is the official witness who reports in how far and 
in which manner the parties have met their respective liabilities under the marriage agreement. 
Also the exchange of tokens (which in a society where illiteracy is common, have the status of 
written agreements) between the bride and her future husband at the initial stages of the 
marriage procedure facilitates court rulings (Bourdillon, 1987). If the court decides that cattle 
should be paid and the son in law perseveres in his refusal then the court has the power to 
confiscate the cattle required. 
 
These measures help to ensure the insurance function in the bride wealth arrangement/ But in 
some instances this does not suffice. Approximately four percent of the marriages are 
dissolved on grounds that are related to the (non)-payment of bride wealth. These divorces are 
personal tragedies but they do not threaten the existence of the bride wealth insurance system. 
A divorced woman may remarry, in which case the bride wealth demanded will be lowered, 
dependent on the number of children she has given birth to (Dekker and Hoogeveen, 2000). 
 
Another way to opt out of the insurance arrangement is to fulfill a bride wealth obligation as 
soon as one is able to do so. But there is a social stigma that prevents son in law’s from doing 
so (Dekker and Hoogeveen, 2000). This stigma is still in place as is illustrated by the fact that 
bride wealth is repaid slowly over time. Of the 571 marriages only 21 percent had repaid all 
bride wealth cattle even though households possess sufficient cattle to do so. In fact in 30 
percent of the cases, the head of household could repay the outstanding bride wealth liabilities 
of all married women residing in his household and still be left with at least six head of cattle!  
 
4.2  Changes in risk  
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Voluntary informal insurance mechanisms may fail if households become more involved in the 
market economy or following the implementation of social safety nets like food for work 
schemes (Platteau, 1987; Dercon, 1999). The reason for this is opposite to the reason why 
punishment helps enforce an informal insurance arrangement. In this case these innovations 
provide extra possibilities for income smoothing. Since the informal insurance is voluntary, 
these additional possibilities undermine the functioning of the insurance.  
 
Changes in Zimbabwe’s economic environment, which in turn affected the income variability 
of households, have indeed affected the marriage arrangement. Service marriages, at which 
the son-in-law works for the father of the bride to fulfill his bride wealth liabilities disappeared 
after the occurrence of a labor market (Holleman, 1975). More recently opposition has arisen 
against the passing on of wives in replacement marriages. Nowadays it is more common to 
allow them to remarry. This change appears to be a response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
Especially if one suspects the husband to have died of this disease, does one prefer his wife to 
remarry with someone else, rather than with a brother of the deceased husband.  
 
Certain authors suggest that the demand of bride wealth (the core element of the insurance 
mechanism), is rapidly disappearing. Meekers (1993) reports for instance that “young couples 
increasingly oppose the payment or roora”, p.50. She draws her conclusion on the basis of 
data collected in Harare, Zimbabwe’s capital city. But her finding need not hold in a rural 
context. A priori one would expect urban households to have more reason to deflect from an 
informal insurance scheme: they are less dependent on the vagaries of the weather, some 
households are sufficiently wealthy that they can opt-out of any informal insurance 
arrangement, social control is less in urban areas and possibilities for income source 
diversification are greater. That in an urban setting roora is loosing its appeal is therefore not 
terribly surprising. But in rural areas, where formal insurance is absent and risks invariably 
large, it would be. It is therefore not very surprising that an attempt in 1950 to limit bride 
wealth by legislation failed in its purpose and had to be repealed in 1962 (Bourdillon, 1987). 
But also the more recent evidence (as presented in figure two for instance) suggests that there 
is no ground to expect that bride wealth is loosing its insurance function in rural areas. On the 
contrary. The figure suggests that the core element of marriage, the creation of mutual debt 
relations, has has hardly changed since 1935. Also, the fact that land reform beneficiaries, who 
depend on agriculture for a much larger fraction of their income and are therefore more 
vulnerable to risk, are more actively involved in the bride wealth claims and liabilities 
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exchanges is at least suggestive of the opposite. Bride wealth still has an important insurance 
function.  
 
Figure 2 here  
 
4.3  Timing of marriage 
 
The optimal timing of marriage over the household lifecycle would be to marry daughters early 
in life, and sons late. If daughters marry when they are young, then the household becomes a 
net claimant to unpaid bride wealth. If, during this period some bride wealth is repaid, this 
allows the household to experience a period of high returns. Late marriage of sons has several 
advantages: the loss of productive draft power for the first installment of the bride wealth is 
postponed and, by postponing the marriage, the household has more time to accumulate 
sufficient cattle. If the household acquires many beasts, additional cattle becomes less 
productive so that the marriage of a son is relatively cheap in livestock terms. Unfortunately 
the available data do not allow us to test whether the payment of bride wealth is a factor that 
helps explain the finding that Zimbabwean men enter their first marriage at a much later age 
than Zimbabwean women (CSO, 1995).8  
 
Changing the perspective slightly, one would expect the timing of marriage of unmarried 
daughters to be such that it coincides with a time when (i) cattle is desperately needed or (ii) 
when the household is in the “danger zone” so that it is good to have a debtor on which claims 
can be put. This possibility is explicitly recognized in what has been labeled credit marriages, 
the arrangement where a young daughter, in exceptional cases even a yet unborn girl, is 
promised for marriage in order to obtain advance payment of the bride wealth. Credit 
marriages are officially prohibited. Nonetheless Vijfhuizen (1998: 21) reports a surge in credit 
marriages after the 1992 drought in Chipinge District. Less extreme is the finding that 
daughters of poor households marry when they are relatively younger. This is suggested by the 
information presented in table four where it is tested whether the mean age of marriage is 
lower for girls from families with few heads of cattle (labeled poor) relative to those with 
sufficient draft animals, the non-poor.  
                                                 
8 The median age at first marriage for men is 25 years, compared with 19 for women. Only 11 percent of 
men are married by age 20, compared to 62 percent for women 
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Table 4 here  
 
4.4  Efficiency 
 
It was suggested in section two that in a conditional claims and liabilities arrangement no 
interest would be demanded of a household that is a net debtor. This reflects the risk pooling 
element in the bride wealth system. Only a household in need calls in (part of) its outstanding 
debt. In doing so it is likely to be due more than it owes. As a detailed assessment of livestock 
value in Zimbabwe’s communal areas by Scoones (1992) demonstrates that cattle yield a high 
return, this amounts to a substantial transfer of resources (unpaid interest). These high returns 
might be a reason to quickly call in all outstanding debt. After all, a family that ensures that its 
son-in-laws pay all bride wealth due and that is slow in paying its bride wealth liabilities, 
generates a high return from its action. That this does not happen (most bride wealth remains 
unpaid for a substantial period) illustrates that households value the option value of a livestock 
claim or that interest is paid. The latter is not the case. Only when repayment is urgently 
needed and the debtor unable to fulfill the request, will he try to give the impatient father in law 
a small contribution that is not considered repayment of the outstanding bride wealth. And 
even this is considered to be more a sign of “the earnest inclination to pay off the debt” 
(Holleman, 1975: 173) than payment of interest.  
 
The absence of the demand of interest and the conditional receipt/payment of claims are the 
risk pooling elements in the bride wealth system. Obviously, these kinds of risk pooling are not 
fully efficient. A formal insurance would allow families to pool risks beyond unpaid interest on 
transferred endowments, and a formal credit agency would be able to offer credit beyond the 
limits imposed by the amount of outstanding bride wealth debt. Nevertheless, it is tempting to 
conclude that the presence of a security enhancing institution like Shona marriage implies a 
welfare gain relative to the situation where it would be absent: why else would this kind of 
arrangement have come into existence? But this interpretation need not hold in a dynamic 
context since the combination of marriage and bride wealth provides a link between 
procreation and security and puts a premium on having children (unmarried daughters). This is 
not inefficient per se, as long as the consequences of such an arrangement are fully borne by 
the household. But, the increase in the rate of birth is likely to have spillover effects to other 
households. These might be negative, for instance when land becomes scarce, or positive 
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when increased population pressure leads to technological innovations.  
 
An additional aspect is that it is unclear what the consequences of the bride wealth 
arrangement are for other informal insurance mechanisms. The need for such arrangements 
has diminished substantially as the size of the bride wealth claims and liabilities is large relative 
to income. At an average value of 7.8 heads of cattle and Z$ 1765 in cash (in 1995) bride 
wealth represents two yearly incomes for resettled households and five for communal 
households! If one takes into account that in Zimbabwe a women at the end of her fertility 
would have given birth to 6.3 children (CSO, 1995), not all of whom survive or  get married, 
then it suggests that households hold claims and liabilities representing a large part  --25 
percent is a conservative estimate, of their lifetime income. So the bride wealth system will 
negatively affect the incentive to join a different arrangement: a household that holds claims 
and liabilities is already able to smooth away the worst fluctuations in income. But a 
conditional claims and liabilities mechanism could just as well reinforce the functioning of an 
informal insurance arrangement. This is the case when the household is demanded to fulfill its 
bride wealth obligation at a time when it has to make a large net transfer to the pool. If the 
household has to fulfill this request first, then the net contribution to the pool diminishes and 
opting out of the insurance becomes less attractive. In any event, unambiguous conclusions 
about the Pareto improving character of Shona marriage or about the effects of the 
arrangement on the existence of other informal insurance mechanisms cannot be drawn. 
 
4.5  Relevance beyond Zimbabwe 
 
This paper has shown that the demand of bride wealth improves security for Shona households 
in Zimbabwe by associating marriage with the possibility to obtain livestock. Through its 
association with marriage, the enforcement problem is reduced because punishment which 
affects the procreation of the lineage is considered a serious threat. And by demanding 
livestock, the problems associated with covariant risks can be largely circumvented. The 
Shona are not the only ethnic group in Southern Africa that demand bride wealth and attribute 
a central role to cattle  in their economy. The Xhosa, Twana, Zulu, Swazi, Ndebele, Khoi, 
Herero, San, Shona, Tonga, Lunda, Lozi, Ndemby, in short all but one of the ethnic groups 
living in southern Africa distinguished by Middleton et al. (1995) do so, just like the Nuer who 
live in Sudan, the Gusii in Tanzania and the Turkana in Kenya. The only exception in Southern 
Africa are the Bemba, who live in a tse-tse infested area and cannot keep cattle.  
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The demand of bride wealth and the importance of cattle is not the only aspect uniting these 
ethnic groups. They also practice rain fed agriculture in semi-arid tropical areas that can be 
characterized by land abundance and relatively low population density. These factors can in 
turn be associated with the absence of land, labor, formal credit and insurance markets and 
large geographically correlated weather risks (Binswanger en McIntire, 1987). The absence of 
labor markets creates a premium on family labor so that, like in Zimbabwe, enforcement of 
any informal insurance arrangement might be facilitated if it allows to pose a threat on the 
ability for procreation and the availability of family labor. Given that these ethnic groups face 
similar weather risk, use a comparable, draft power based, production technology and demand 
bride wealth in the form of cattle there is a fair reason to assume that they too make use of 
the possibility not to pay all bride wealth at the time of marriage. If they do so they enhance, 
like the Shona, household security by creating claims and liabilities.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
In this paper it is claimed that the marriage arrangement in Zimbabwe in which bride wealth is 
demanded for an unmarried daughter, is an informal security enhancing mechanism. To be 
functional as insurance mechanism, the arrangement has to deal with information problems 
and covariant risk. By expressing bride wealth primarily in cattle, information problems are 
dealt with because the number of cattle possessed can be observed by anyone. The 
importance of covariant risk is reduced because cattle ownership is much less correlated with 
rainfall than is income, while the ownership of cattle is closely associated with the ability to 
generate income.  
 
The claim of this paper is supported by empirical evidence. It is shown that only a small 
fraction of bride wealth is paid at the time of marriage and that most remains outstanding for a 
prolonged period. In regression analysis it is shown that bride wealth claims are contingent: 
families obtain resources when they are less well off while resources are provided by 
households that possess sufficient heads of cattle. 
 
The importance of the bride wealth as informal insurance arrangement stems from several 
factors. First, the amounts involved are large. The average value that unmarried sons and 
daughters represent is conservatively put at 25 percent of lifetime household income. 
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Secondly, the mechanism incorporates nearly the complete adult population including the 
vulnerable. And finally it is a smart way of creating a large insurance pool without the need for 
a central organization that monitors each participant in the pool.  
 
To put the insurance interpretation of marriage to further scrutiny several of its implications 
are considered. It is shown how the arrangement is enforced by relying on different kinds of 
(threats with) punishment. It is also shown that in urban areas, where income risks are smaller 
and diversification easier, opposition to bride wealth has arisen. This does not apply to rural 
areas. Daughters from households that are vulnerable to income shocks (the poor) and who 
therefore have a greater incentive to possess a positive balance in bride wealth claims are 
shown to marry younger. Sometimes poor households even promise their under-aged 
daughters into marriage.  
 
Though the insurance interpretation of marriage suggest that the arrangement is likely to 
enhance welfare it is shown that this need not be the case. The marriage arrangement may be 
an obstacle to the introduction of other insurance mechanisms and it may contribute to high 
population growth. Finally it is argued that the arrangement need not be confined to 
Zimbabwe. It could be functional in many parts of Africa as long as they are characterized by 
land abundance, the demand of bride wealth and the use of cattle as draft power and store of 
wealth  
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Table 1 
Correlation coefficients for the period 1992/3-1997/81 
 National rainfall in mm 
Household crop income   0.28 * 
Household real total income2    0.24 * 
Household maize yield   0.32 * 
Household cattle    0.03  
Household cattle sold - 0.11 * 
1All income sources are in Z$1990. Presented are population correlations for resettled 
households in the natural regions II, III and IV. An asterix indicates a correlation significant at 
the 1 percent level or higher. 
2 Total income comprises gross income from agriculture and own enterprises, income from 
livestock products, public transfers and private remittances and income from off farm 
employment. 
3Measured in livestock equivalents, based on median prices.  
Source: Kinsey surveys. Rainfall data obtained from the Zimbabwean Meteorological Service. 
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Table 2 
Household cattle ownership in 1992 and 1999 (n=385) 
observations number of beast in 1992 
number of 
beast in 1999 
at most 2 3 or 4 5 or 6 7 or 8 9 or 10 more than 10 
at least 2 29 7 5 4 0 6 
3 or 4 8 3 12 2 2 13 
5 or 6 4 7 15 6 1 9 
7 or 8 8 6 7 4 3 9 
9 or 10 1 3 4 6 2 7 
more than 10 8 14 11 22 13 124 
observations 58 40 54 44 21 168 
Source: Calculated from Kinsey data 
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Table 3 
Village level fixed effects logit regressions of bride wealth received (intransfer) and paid (outtransfer) 1 
Dependent variable is 1 if household received / provided bride wealth Intransfer   Outtransfer  
 Odds ratio P-value   Odds ratio P-value  
Pre transfer livestock possession (in equivalents) (-)    0.9576 0.006  (+)   1.0241 0.064 
Bride wealth transferred out /in for households with sufficient draft cattle                     ( *) (+)   1.0496 0.034  (+)   1.0524 0.054 
Bride wealth transferred out/in for households with few draft cattle                             (**) (-)   0.9463 0.901  (+)   1.1615 0.724 
Log real household income (+)  1.2678 0.053  (+)   1.3734 0.002 
Rain in mm (-)   0.9978 0.028  (+)   1.0004 0.682 
D-death in family (+)   1.0306 0.918  (+)   1.7396 0.007 
D-daughter married (+)   4.3313 0.000  (+)  1.0577 0.684 
D-communal area (-)   0.7307 0.000  (-)   0.4862 0.000 
Obs. 1631   1631  
Relevant subpopulation (head of household aged 35 or above) 1543   1543  
F (6,20) 70.09   16.89  
Prob > F 0.0000   0.0000  
Wald test on equality of coefficients of (*) and (**)                                                F(1,25) 0.06   0.05  
                                                                                                                                  Prob 
> F 
0.8160   0.8168  
1 Stratification by natural region (3 in total), clustering by village (28 in total). Observations are not weighted. The period covered is 1995/6 – 1997/8. Village 
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level dummies are not reported. 
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Table 4 
Mean comparison test of age at marriage of own daughters married between 1994 and 1998 
from poor and non-poor households*  
 Age at marriage Std. 
error 
Obs.   
Non-poor 21.9 0.34 170    
Poor 20.6 0.59 40    
H0:   mean (non-poor) – mean(poor) = x = 0 
Ha:   x < 0  x unequal 0  x > 0     
T-stat  1.93  1.93   1.93     
P-value 0.97  0.06   0.03  
*  T-test on the equality of means. Data are not assumed to have equal variances. Poor is 
defined as having less than or equal to 2.5 livestock equivalents. Age of marriage could only 
be determined for surveys done between 1995-1999, reflecting the years 1994-1998..  
Source: Kinsey surveys 
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Figure 1 
Kernel estimation of the percentage of bride wealth outstanding and date when marriage was 
concluded 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kinsey surveys 
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Figure 2 
Kernel estimation of the bride wealth demanded and year of marriage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kinsey surveys 
 
.
year
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
